



















































In 2013, at the unveiling of Franjo 
Tuđman’s statue in Split, Ćiro Blažević, 
the legendary soccer coach who was the 
late president’s intimate friend, emo-
tionally claimed that "we Croats are the 
1 I would like to thank the three anonymous 
reviewers for their very helpful comments, 
which significantly impacted the final for-
mulations in the paper. Any remaining 
weaknesses are of course my own. 
most glorious warriors".2 Croatia is a so-
ciety in which the question "where were 
you in 1991?" embodies the essence of 
political identity, distinguishing those 
who stood to fight against everybody 
else. This catchphrase is a rhetorical 
weapon used to silence those who dare 
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Abstract the paper theorizes about the type of welfare state that emerged in Cro-
atia post-1990, focusing specifically on ways in which the evolution of welfare pro-
grammes for veterans, and the gradual strengthening of veteran organizations as 
pivotal political actors, impacted its morphology. Croatia currently has a population 
of around 500,000 registered veterans, which in the mid-1990 started organizing 
into powerful organizations. Partly in response to this mobilization, from 1994 
onwards hDZ governments created a comprehensive institutional architecture of 
entitlements for veterans, instituting durable material linkages alongside symbolic 
ties to this population. the prominence of veterans as a pivotal political actor has 
impacted the development of the welfare regime in Croatia. Strong reliance on the 
family for a broad range of care work is the central feature Croatia shares with other 
conservative welfare regimes, while the clientelist character of state-society rela-
tions relates it specifically to their Southern variant. Distinctly, the "compensatory" 
character of welfare programmes, which is characteristic of veteran programmes, 
and of family policy in Croatia generally, creates contradictory impulses. What 
seems to have emerged is a specific clientelist variant of a conservative welfare re-
gime, sustained by veteran mobilizations, while at the same time eroded by the de-
pendency, resentment and a myriad of other social impacts of these programmes. 
future research on the welfare state in Croatia will hopefully further explore the 
arguments that this paper brings forward.

























question the official narrative that glo-
rifies the Homeland War. The soldier 
is the ideal citizen, and the veteran de-
serves special rights for making the state 
(Jović 2017). Such a militarized political 
culture is probably sustained by more 
than the collective memory of the war. 
Salient political identities emerge from 
successful political mobilization that 
shapes dominant political cleavages and 
influences the state’s distributive deci-
sions. Attempting to shed some light on 
this complex dynamic, this paper focus-
es in particular on the evolution of wel-
fare programmes for veterans and how 
they play into the type of welfare regime 
that has emerged in Croatia.
Thirty years has gone by since Esping 
Andersen (1990) typologized European 
welfare state regimes, describing their 
liberal, conservative and social dem-
ocratic variants. Much ink has been 
spilled since in expanding, tweaking and 
criticising his typology, but its under-
lying analytical clarity is arguably still 
indispensable when attempting to ab-
stract from thick descriptions of social 
programmes in a given national context, 
to something that would resemble a 
comparative analysis. This is true even 
if we are interested in the post-socialist 
region, where welfare systems arguably 
never fully conformed to any of Esping 
Anderson’s three ideal types. Perhaps 
surprisingly, scholarship on post-social-
ist welfare regimes suggests that both 
their state socialist institutional legacies, 
and their post-1990 trajectories have 
made them resemble the conservative 
welfare regime type.
Taking all this on board, this paper 
attempts a tentative theorization of the 
type of welfare state that has emerged in 
Croatia, focusing specifically on ways in 
which social programmes for veterans3 
3 I use the term veteran since this is how the 
population is referred to in the relevant 
literature, but in Croatia this population 
impacted the morphology of the post-
1990 welfare state in Croatia. I aim to 
show that the development of compre-
hensive social programmes for veterans 
has contributed to a strengthening of 
an already conservative welfare regime. 
The paper first presents the major fea-
tures of Esping Andersen’s typology, 
and analyses features of post-socialist 
welfare regimes. After that it describes 
the evolution of legislating veterans’ and 
their families’ rights and entitlements, 
and provides estimates of the compara-
tive breadth and comprehensiveness of 
welfare state programmes for veterans. 
The third section analyses the emer-
gence and character of veterans’ organ-
izations, discussing their relevance as 
a civil society actor, while the fourth 
section looks at ways in which their po-
litical mobilization influences political 
dynamics in Croatia. In the conclusion I 
relate the described ‘soldier’s state’ to Es-
ping Andersen’s typology, arguing that 
Croatia is best understood as a clien-
telist, conservative welfare regime with a 
myriad of contradictory social impulses. 
Welfare regimes in 
Europe, Post-Socialist 
Hybrids and Croatia
The ideas that brought to life the 20th 
century welfare state are now relics of the 
past, since the broad political consensus 
that brought it to life has long crumbled 
(Berman 2006; Thomson 2000; Keman 
2017). Nevertheless, since institutions 
are generally sticky (Pierson 2004), and 
institutions that confer material benefits 
to citizens are particularly so, even after 
30 years of convergence pressure under 
neoliberal policy recipes, one can still 
discern differences between social dem-
ocratic, conservative and liberal welfare 
regimes. The underlying idea that redis-
tributive social programmes should, in 
self-identifies with, and is referred to, as 



















































the final instance, fundamentally trans-
form capitalist societies by emancipating 
citizens from economic necessity may 
have been marginalized, but the under-
lying rationale for the existence of a wel-
fare state is still there: social programmes 
decommodify the individual vis-à-vis 
the market. Acknowledging that humans 
are not a commodity in the same way as 
cars are, welfare state programmes aim 
to reduce the dependence of human 
conditions of survival upon laws of de-
mand and supply in the labour market 
(Esping Andersen 1990). Humans, apart 
from working, are expected to reproduce 
themselves and the societies in which 
they live in. This means that full human 
commodification, in which whether you 
live or die depends on you receiving a 
wage, is unsustainable – even from the 
point of view of the owners of capital 
(Esping Anderson 1990). At the same 
time, though a comprehensive welfare 
state became a common goal for post-
war Western European societies, not all 
of them have accomplished the same 
level of decommodification of their pop-
ulations, either in terms of level of social 
support, or its reach.
Developing these assumptions, Es-
ping Andersen (1990), described types 
of cross-class coalitions that led to the 
development of three basic types of 
welfare state: liberal, conservative and 
social democratic. According to his un-
derstanding, differences among them 
were not simply ‘more or less’ in terms 
of social expenditure; there was also a 
qualitative difference, resulting from 
underlying political ideologies (Em-
menegger et al 2015). The cornerstone 
institution tasked with the provision for 
human wellbeing in the liberal regime 
is the market, in the conservative it is 
the family, and in the social democrat-
ic regime it is the state. In other words, 
only social democratic welfare regimes 
strive to de-couple human wellbeing 
both from market forces and from fam-
ily circumstances. And indeed, most 
recent analyses suggest that only social 
democratic regimes manage to enhance 
upward mobility chances for working 
class children (Esping Andersen 2015).
In contrast, liberal welfare regimes 
view "servicing as a natural market ac-
tivity" (Esping Andersen 2000: 73), with 
social guarantees typically restricted 
to those worst off. Finally, in the con-
servative welfare regime, the family 
remains the primary source of social 
reproduction and social programmes 
are to a substantial extent tied to work 
status. This means that both liberal 
and conservative welfare regimes re-
inforce social stratitfication; in the lib-
eral regime the key social stratification 
happens according to class, while "the 
essence of a conservative regime lies in 
its blend of status segmentation4 and 
familialism" (Esping Andersen 2000: 
81). Familialism, a concept that cap-
tures both the male bread-winner bias 
of social protection and the centrality 
of the family as care-giver, is particu-
larly relevant for conservative regimes 
in Southern Europe (Esping Anders-
en 2000). Subsequent literature, which 
aimed to address Esping Andersen’s lack 
of attention to the ways in which gen-
der structures welfare provision, further 
developed this concept. Leitner (2003: 
357) argues that some welfare regimes 
are explicitly familialist, in that they not 
only "strengthen the family in caring for 
children, the handicapped and the el-
4 Esping Andersen refers to status segmen-
tation also as corporativism. He measures 
corporativism as the number of occupa-
tionally distinct public pension schemes 
(1990, 2000). In Italy for instance pensions 
are divided into more than 120 occupa-
tional plans. In Germany on the other 
hand, there is modest corporativism in 
pensions, but the health insurance is 'a 
labyrinth of 1,200 separate regional, occu-
pational, or company-based funds' (Esping 
























derly through familialistic policies", but 
they lack the provision of alternatives to 
family care. Welfare states vary in the 
extent to which governments reinforce 
patriarchal relations or aim to transform 
gender relations; on that continuum, 
explicit familialism is particularly con-
servative, reinforcing gendered parent-
ing (Javornik 2014).
How were state socialist welfare sys-
tems different from the types just de-
scribed? Orenstein (2008) highlights 
four significant differences. Firstly, state 
socialism was premised on the idea of 
full employment,5 and this meant that 
the tax base was wider, with less de-
mand for state social assistance.6 Sec-
ondly, benefit levels and service quality 
were typically lower than in the West, 
but the extent and variety of social pro-
vision was broader. These systems pro-
vided universal medical care, old-age 
and disability pensions, maternity and 
family benefits – like Western states; but 
they also subsidized basic foodstuffs, 
provided housing, and made affordable 
cultural activities and vacation options. 
Thirdly, state owned enterprises took 
on important roles in social provision, 
providing housing, subsidized food, 
day care, vacation homes and so on. Fi-
nally, better services and housing were 
reserved for the privileged, while at the 
same time such provisions were avail-
able to a wide swath of the population. 
These governments aimed to provide 
widely for the working class, but at the 
same time used the welfare state as a 
mechanism for differential distribution, 
"to punish opponents and reward sup-
porters" (Orenstein 2008: 83).
5 Yugoslavia is a partial exception, since it 
dealt with unemployment already within 
the socialist system (Milanović 1998).
6 Participation in the labour force, particu-
larly among women, were higher than in 
liberal market economies where market 
incentives to work are very high (Orenstein 
2008).
If we accept Orenstein’s summary of 
welfare programmes in state socialist 
regimes, we can draw several inferenc-
es regarding their relationship to Esping 
Andersen’s typology. Firstly, in terms of 
intention, the aim of these systems was 
universal welfare provision, with a dom-
inant role played by the state – both as 
direct employer,7 and in the provision 
of services. Therefore, in intention, and 
partially in implementation, we could 
argue that they were closest to social 
democratic welfare regime types. At 
the same time, since Eastern European 
countries were much poorer, the actual 
level of benefits and the quality of ser-
vices they provided was not at a com-
parable level to Scandinavian countries 
that embody the social democratic wel-
fare regime. Taking this on board, and 
since in these systems the workplace 
was a key access point to social benefits 
(Deacon 2000: 147), suggest that social-
ist regimes resemble conservative wel-
fare regimes. Furthermore, the fact that 
Communist parties typically manipu-
lated state resources for patronage pur-
poses is also more characteristic of con-
servative welfare regimes. For instance, 
Fererra (1996) described how in Italy, a 
conservative welfare regime in Esping 
Andersen’s typology, disability pensions 
and public-sector jobs were the primary 
vehicles of political clientelism.8
7 In Yugoslavia in 1988 state employment as 
a proportion of the labour force was 78.9%, 
compared to 21.2% OECD average (Mila-
nović 1998).
8 While Ferrera (1996) argued that these, 
and some other features, warranted the 
introduction of a fourth, Southern welfare 
regime, Esping Andersen (2000) considered 
clientelism a "perverted use" of social pro-
grammes with important political implica-
tions, but not as a characteristic that would 
define a separate welfare regime. In Esping 
Andersen’s typology, a "regime" refers to 
"the ways in which welfare production is 
allocated between state, market and house-
holds" (2000: 73). Much of the scholarship 



















































Deacon (2000) argues that the logic of 
post-socialist welfare regime trajectory 
was towards the conservative regime be-
cause workplace entitlements and status 
differentials could be easily converted 
into "insurance-based, wage related and 
differentiated benefit entitlements of 
the Austro–German, Bismarckian kind" 
(2000: 151-152). At the same time, this 
"natural" trajectory towards the con-
servative welfare regime was pushed 
towards the liberal type by budgetary 
pressures on governments during the 
economic transformation and aided by 
loan conditions of the IMF and World 
Bank (Deacon 2000). The immediate 
shock of regime change brought the 
abrupt removal of wide ranging subsi-
dies and the collapse of guaranteed full 
employment, creating massive unem-
ployment and poverty (Orenstein 2008). 
In Croatia, the percentage decline in 
GDP between 1987 and 1996 was 47%, 
a decline surpassed in the post-socialist 
region only by Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Tajikistan (Milanović 1998). The 
World Bank (2001: x) study for Croatia 
recorded that inequality in Croatia was 
"far higher than generally observed in 
transition and market economies".
Initially international economic ad-
visers were focused on market liberali-
zation and privatization, with little to say 
about social policy reform beside devel-
oping unemployment insurance (Oren-
stein and Haas 2005). This changed 
in the mid-1990s, when international 
financial institutions gained strong in-
fluence in social reform, creating con-
vergence pressure towards neoliberal 
policies (Ferge 1997). Between 1994 and 
2004, eleven post socialist countries, 
including Croatia, partially privatized 
their pension systems along the lines 
proposed by the World Bank (Orenstein 
world into the typology, as well as analyse 
ways in which gender affected welfare state 
outcomes, often does not focus on this cen-
tral feature of Esping Andersen’s typology. 
and Haas 2005; Orenstein 2008). Over-
all, Orenstein concludes that European 
post-socialist states drew on their con-
servative Bismarckian traditions, with a 
strong reliance on social insurance and 
status-preserving benefits where "the 
better off have a stronger safety net" and 
where traditional family structures are 
supported (2008: 92). Going back to the 
discussion of familialism as a character-
istic of conservative regimes, Dobrotić 
and Vučković (2016) classify Croatia in 
the explicit familialism group, where the 
state reinforces existing patriarchal rela-
tionships by relying on the family as the 
main source of care provision (Leitner 
2003).
These analyses suggest that the wel-
fare regime in Croatia is dominantly 
conservative, supporting various sta-
tus differentials as well as traditional, 
patriarchal gender roles. How does the 
development of comprehensive social 
programmes for veterans fit into this 
picture? Stubbs and Zrinščak (2009, 
2011, 2015) discuss the provision of so-
cial programmes for veterans in terms 
of clientelist relations, where clientelism 
refers to "a broad set of hegemonic po-
litical practices and strategies marked 
by particularistic modes of governance, 
exclusivist definitions of citizenship, 
and asymmetrical distribution and re-
distribution of resources" (Stubbs and 
Zrinščak 2015: 398). According to the 
authors, multiple social processes in 
Croatia seem to speak in evidence of cli-
entelism: a very large number of benefi-
ciaries, the fact that veterans have higher 
level benefits than other social groups, 
increases in the coverage of these bene-
fits during pre-election periods, as well 
as a lack of procedures of monitoring 
and assessment which would most prob-
ably increase efficiency of the system 
(2015). These descriptions echo Ferrera 
(1996) account of similar mechanisms 
























What about the impact that domestic 
political dynamics have on the evolution 
of the welfare regime? The main argu-
ment of the power resource approach 
is that ruling parties have significant 
impact on social policy development 
(Korpi 1983; Esping Andersen 1990; 
Aidukaite 2009; Häusermann et al. 
2013). Countries with strong left-wing 
parties, powerful labour unions and a 
significant working-class presence in 
the decision-making apparatus devel-
oped social democratic welfare regimes, 
while comparatively weaker working 
class political mobilization led to liber-
al and conservative welfare regimes. In 
post-socialist Europe after 1990 the Left 
collapsed; former communist parties 
rebranded themselves into social dem-
ocrats, but they effectively embraced 
neoliberalism (Greskovits 1996). Work-
ers were symbolically and materially de-
throned from the political stage (Dole-
nec 2014). In other words, there was no 
Left force to press for the development 
of a welfare state on universalist princi-
ples. Instead, out of 28 years since Cro-
atia’s independence, 20 have been under 
the leadership of the conservative na-
tionalist political party HDZ. Over time, 
the political dynamic between this polit-
ical party and veteran organizations sig-
nificantly influenced the development 
and the morphology of the welfare state 
in Croatia. The following sections, two, 
three and four, look at the evolution of 
this social dynamic in more detail. 
The Evolution of Welfare 
Programmes for Veterans
Scholarship that explores links between 
war, state-building and the development 
of the welfare state is not prolific. Ac-
cording to one recent summary (Mad-
daloni 2014), the key relationship stems 
from the fact that after the war has en-
ded, soldiers and other participants in 
the war effort become a potential risk 
for the state, given the "democratizati-
on of violence facilities" that war enta-
ils. The state historically managed this 
risk of political unrest by stimulating 
nationalism and, subsequently also po-
litical citizenship (Bendix 1964; Gellner 
and Breuilly 1983). In Germany during 
Bismarck, nationalist fervour was also 
accompanied with the expansion of so-
cial entitlements (Wolin 1987). Similar-
ly, in the United States Skocpol (1995) 
traces the origin of the welfare state to 
the Civil War. One of the main factors 
that drove the US to legislate social pro-
tection was the need to solve the politi-
cal problem caused by veterans and the 
disabled from the Civil War. In respon-
se, the government established a benefit 
programme for veterans that eventually 
accounted for 18 percent of all federal 
expenditure (Gal and Bar 2000).
The relationship between the state 
and veterans is premised on a "moral 
asymmetry" whereby veterans suffer the 
absolute sacrifice, which the state only 
relatively compensates via material ben-
efits (Begić, Sanader and Žunec 2007). 
Historically states provide veterans, and 
especially disabled veterans, with gener-
ous pensions and a vast array of medical, 
rehabilitation and reintegration services 
(Gerber 2003). These benefits are con-
ceived as rights, not "welfare", which 
is used pejoratively to reference public 
assistance provided to those considered 
"unworthy" (Gal and Bar 2000). In that 
sense, the standard conception of wel-
fare as a means for the state to exercise 
power over its citizens (Pateman 1988; 
Wolin 1987) is not applicable in the 
case of veterans. "Worthiness" as a ba-
sis for social entitlements (Williamson, 
Skocpol and Coggin 2012) is always 
present in the dynamic between the state 
and welfare recipients. Target popula-
tions of social programmes are not neu-
tral, either to the state, or to public opin-



















































ed, with normative characterisations 
that portray them in positive or negative 
terms through symbols, metaphors and 
stories (Schneider and Ingram 1993). 
Schneider and Ingram (1993) proposed 
a typology of target populations based 
on two key characteristics: whether they 
are powerful (based on their mobili-
zation capacity) and whether they are 
construed as positive or negative. Table 
1 shows their typology and the social 
groups they categorise.
According to Schneider and Ingram 
(1993), veterans represent an advan-
taged target population, which is both 
strong and positively socially construed. 
The implication of this typology is that 
advantaged groups will receive more 
beneficial policy than is warranted ei-
ther in terms of policy effectiveness or 
representativeness. Furthermore, "ad-
vantaged groups have the resources and 
capacity to shape their own construc-
tions and to combat attempts that would 
portray them negatively" (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993: 337). Once social protec-
tion mechanisms for veterans are insti-
tuted, interest groups organize to defend 
them (Gal and Bar 2000; Brooks and 
Manza 2007; Maddaloni 2014), creating 
an ongoing dynamic with the state. If 
the veteran group is large enough, like 
was the case in the late 19th century US, 
and in Croatia in the 1990s, veteran or-
ganizations can become pivotal political 
players, forging alliances with political 
parties and influencing election out-
comes.9
In the case of the US, Skocpol (1995) 
argues that the Republican Party fos-
tered rapid growth of the veteran or-
ganization Grand Army of the Repub-
lic (GAR). This organization achieved 
many legislative successes regarding 
pensions and other benefits, and, ac-
cording to Skocpol (1995), became or-
ganizationally and ideologically central 
to the politics of late 19th ct. America. 
Similarly, Ainsworth (1995) argues that 
the GAR was a formidable electoral 
player, influencing the soldiers’ vote to 
affect outcomes of presidential and con-
gressional races. Ainsworth (1995) finds 
that the GAR, successfully lobbied leg-
islators to support both the Arrears Act 
of 1879 and the Disability Pension Act 
of 1890. The case of Croatia, as this pa-
per shows, exhibits some important par-
allels to this dynamic. However, many 
9 Recent research argues that the same can 
be said of veterans in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Obradović (2017) argues that vete-
rans in Bosnia and Herzegovina are well 
organised, their associations are financed 
by the government and they have become 
important pressure groups in the country’s 
political system. On veterans in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina see also Bougarel (2006), Ber-
dak (2015) and Hronesova (2016). 




Strong Advantaged: the elderly, 
business, veterans, scientists
Contenders: the rich, big 
unions, minorities, cultural 
elites, moral majority
Weak Dependents: children, 
mothers, disabled
Deviants: criminals, drug 
addicts, communists, flag 
burners, gangs
























dimensions of this phenomenon are 
under-researched, so this paper puts to-
gether an incomplete mosaic that merits 
further investigation.10
Croatia had experience with welfare 
programmes for veterans before the 
Homeland War. Partisans who fought 
in the Second World War in Croatia 
were awarded the status of veterans in 
socialist Yugoslavia, and many received 
state-insured pensions.11 Furthermore, 
militarism was deeply embedded in 
Yugoslav culture, forming an integral 
part of one of its grand narratives (Ber-
dak 2015). Socialist Yugoslavia "derived 
a great deal of its legitimacy from a 
founding myth according to which the 
people, united within the national liber-
ation front, fought against the forces of 
occupation" (Bougarel 2006: 480). After 
the war the Communist party recruited 
massively from among the partisans, 
and SUBNOR – the Union of Associa-
tions of Combatants of the Struggle for 
National Liberation, was one of the par-
ty’s major mass membership organiza-
tions. SUBNOR played a significant role 
in the allocation of pensions, housing, 
scholarships and other benefits, and it 
also maintained representatives in many 
government bodies. Veterans "were re-
warded symbolically through high social 
10 Comparatively speaking, welfare state pro-
grammes for veterans are one of the least 
researched fields of social security (Gal and 
Bar 2000). This is probably due in part to 
the fact that most Western European wel-
fare states have not been involved in major 
military conflicts since World War Two. In 
addition, veteran benefits tend to be admin-
istered by separate bureaucracies, often in 
the purview of military establishment, 
which makes them less accessible.
11 In 2009, 64,000 participants in the Second 
World War (both partisans and soldiers of 
the Independent State of Croatia, NDH) 
were receiving state-subsidised pensions. 
Incidentally, that same year the number 
of Homeland Veteran pensions was also 
64,500 (Bađun 2009).
status and financially through privileged 
access to pensions, flats and positions of 
authority within the Communist par-
ty" (Berdak 2015: 50). In that sense, the 
post-1990 legislation of veteran benefits 
was able to rely on both symbolic and 
institutional legacies from Yugoslavia.
Croatia underwent large-scale mobili-
zation for the war. Full numbers for the 
Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia 
(AFRC) at the time of war are difficult to 
ascertain. According to Marijan (2008), 
at the end of 1991 and beginning of 
1992, the AFRC had 200,000 people un-
der arms. Other sources quote the figure 
of around 300,000 people in total un-
der arms in Croatia during 1991-1992. 
During 1993 the AFRC was reduced to 
52,000 people, while in 1995 it was again 
expanded to 200,000 (Žunec 1998; Be-
gić, Sanader and Žunec 2007). Count-
ing people who took part in the armed 
resistance proved contentious, but ac-
cording to the Official Registry of Vet-
erans, the number of veterans in 2012 
was 503,112. In other words, around 
11.7 percent of the population of Croa-
tia are veterans of the Homeland War. In 
comparison, the United States have 9,3 
m veterans, amounting to around 2.9% 
of the population. According to Smerić 
(2009), the AFRC, formed during the 
Homeland War through mass partic-
ipation, represent one of the formative 
institutions of contemporary Croatian 
state, impacting not only state-adminis-
trative structures, but the entire institu-
tional configuration of Croatian society.
Homeland War veterans’ rights were 
legislated from 1994 onwards.12 The 
state kept the registry of veterans secret 
for almost 20 years; it was only made 
public in 2012, under the government 
12 In 1992 and 1994 the Croatian government 
added soldiers who fought on the side of 
the puppet Nazi regime in Croatia 1941-45 
(NDH) to the status of veterans (Begić, San-



















































led by the Social Democrats (SDP). 
In 2013, the SDP government report-
ed the number of veterans at 503,112. 
If this number is compared to the one 
reported for 2008 (Begić, Sanader and 
Žunec 2007), it seems that 13,700 peo-
ple were added to the official registry 
between 2008 and 2012. Also, though 
open conflict started in mid-1991 and 
the last military operation took place 
in August 1995, subsequent legislation 
regulating veteran status extended the 
period of "armed resistance" from Au-
gust 1990 until June 1996 (Begić, San-
ader and Žunec 2007). Hence, one of 
the larger intakes of new personnel hap-
pened in 1996, a year after military op-
erations had ended (Mahečić 2003). The 
report of the Parliamentary Committee 
of Veterans from October 201413 stated 
that the number of veterans in the offi-
cial registry keeps growing, despite the 
2009 ban on new registrations. In other 
words, since getting listed in the official 
registry is a precondition for claiming 
a host of social entitlements, this status 
has become a much sought good.
HDZ governments started legislating 
veteran rights in 1994, with significant 
changes to the legislation in 1996, 2001 
and 2004 (Begić, Sanader and Žunec 
2007). By 2004, the law accorded 37 
different material entitlements to this 
population, most importantly includ-
ing pensions, disability compensation, 
paid heath and care services, priority in 
securing housing, child allowance, un-
employment benefits, financial help in 
securing employment, tax cuts, scholar-
ships, guaranteed university entry, and 
many others. A comparative study of 
13 Information from the document "Izvješće 
Odbora za ratne veterane o provedbi Zakona 
o pravima hrvatskih branitelja iz Domo-
vinskog rata i članova njihovih obitelji za 
2013. dodinu". Available at http://www.
sabor.hr/izvjesce-odbora-za-ratne-veter-
ane-o-provedbi-z0001. Accessed February 
25, 2018.
eleven countries, including the US, Israel 
and Germany, found Croatia at the very 
top regarding the extent and quality of 
benefits accorded to veterans (Ferenčak, 
Kardov and Rodik 2003; Žunec 2006; 
Dobrotić 2008). The Act from 2004 was 
further amended in 2005, twice in 2007, 
twice in 2009, in 2010, 2011, 2012, three 
times in 2013, once in 2014 and an en-
tirely new Act with significant increases 
in rights and material entitlements was 
introduced in 2017. The 2017 Act reo-
pened the possibility to register as a war 
veteran, reduced the retirement age, ex-
tended the rights of family members to 
inherit veterans' pensions, introduced 
mandatory financing of veterans' asso-
ciations, as well as a number of other 
social benefits (European Commission, 
2018). Between its introduction in No-
vember 2017 and February 2018, 3,955 
applications for the status of disabled 
war veteran have been registered with 
the Ministry of Veterans.14
According to the last available report 
published by the Croatian Government 
in 2013,15 the total annual material 
compensation to veterans was 5,9 bn 
Kuna, which amounted to 5% of the 
state budget (VRH 2014) and around 
1,8% of Croatia's GDP (HNB 2014). 
Veteran pensions represented the larg-
est share of this budget, with over 5 bn 
Kuna in 2013.16 This was followed by 
"permanent material compensation" 




ida-1231339. Accessed March 16, 2918.
15 Publishing reports regarding the imple-
mentation costs of veteran related legisla-
tion were discontinued after HDZ returned 
to government in 2015.
16 According to the Parliamentary Committee 
on Veterans, for 2016 the planned budget 
for veteran pensions was 4,1 bn Kuna. Ava-
ilable at http://www.sabor.hr/izvjesce-odb-
ora-za-ratne-veterane-o-prijedlogu0010. 
























amounting to 696,6 million Kuna, a 
category administered by the Minis-
try of Veterans, pertaining to disabil-
ity compensation and other forms of 
social compensation distributed via a 
complex web of regulations. Of the total 
number of veterans, in September 2016, 
72,001 were recipients of state pensions, 
57,173 (approx. 80%) of which receive 
disability pensions (Croatian Pension 
Fund 3/2016).17 This amounts to 1.3 
per cent of the population – compared 
to 0.85 per cent of the overall popu-
lation of Israel and 0.9 per cent of the 
overall population of the US (Gal and 
Bar 2000). In addition to its wide reach, 
the pension programme for disabled 
veterans in Croatia is generous. Veter-
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina has also developed 
a very substantial welfare state programme 
for veterans. According to some sources, 
nearly 100,000 veterans in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina receive disability pensions (Popić 
and Panjeta 2010).
an pensions are 2.7 to 3.1 times higher 
than standard pensions, while veteran 
disability pensions are around 3 times 
higher than general disability pensions 
(Bađun 2009).18 Similarly, in the cate-
gory of family pensions, veteran family 
pensions are 4 times higher than gen-
eral family pensions. With reference to 
income levels, the average pension in 
Croatia is around 40% of average net 
salary, while average veteran pensions 
are higher than the average net salary 
(Bađun 2009). In comparison, in Israel, 
a welfare state with comprehensive pro-
visions for veterans, fully disabled vet-
erans receive benefits at the level of 66% 
of the average wage (Gal and Bar 2000). 
18 This large difference was noted also by the 
European Commission (2018), quoting data 
from September 2017 from the Croatian 
Pension Insurance Institute, that general 
pensions for war veterans tend to be more 
than twice as high compared to the general 
scheme.











EU 28 19.2 2.8 10.3 1.7 1.4 0.5
Croatia 15.1 4.9 6.7 1.3 0.5 0.0
Slovenia 17.4 2.3 9.9 2.0 0.6 0.0












EU 28 40.6 5.9 21.7 3.7 2.9 1.2
Croatia 32.3 10.5 14.2 2.8 1.0 0.0
Slovenia 36.4 4.7 20.7 4.1 1.3 0.0



















































How do these veteran benefits fit 
into the broader picture of welfare pro-
grammes provided by the Croatian 
state? According to the 2010 World 
Bank report on Croatia, social assistance 
in Croatia heavily relies on "categorical" 
as opposed to needs-based benefits.19 
The largest share of social assistance 
spending in Croatia goes to veterans 
and their survivors – amounting to 1.8% 
of GDP in 2009, compared to 0.5 per-
cent of GDP that goes to poor families 
with children (World Bank 2010: 51). 
The only post-socialist country with a 
similar composition of social spend-
ing is Bosnia and Herzegovina, both in 
terms of overall size of social spending 
in proportion to GDP, and the domi-
nance of social assistance to veterans in 
the composition of social spending. Ac-
cording to the World Bank (2010), the 
size of veteran benefits in proportion to 
Croatia’s GDP has been growing steadily 
since 2004. 
Tables 2 and 3 show 2015 data on 
government expenditure on social pro-
tection, first as percentage of GDP, and 
then as percentage of total expenditure. 
Croatia is compared with the EU 28 av-
erage, and with Slovenia, a country with 
which Croatia shared institutional fea-
tures until the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
Croatia is below EU average regard-
ing the level of social spending, both 
in terms of relationship to GDP, and 
as a percentage in the overall govern-
ment expenditure. Denmark, Finland 
and France are among countries with 
the highest social spending of between 
23-26% of GDP (Eurostat 2017), com-
pared to Croatia’s 15%. In other words, 
Croatia is far from a social democratic 
welfare regime in terms of the size of 
its welfare state. In terms of categories 
19 Means tested programmes play only a mar-
ginal role in Croatia’s welfare state pro-
grammes, accounting for only 7% of total 
spending (World Bank 2010).
of social spending, Croatia is below EU 
average in all categories except for "sick-
ness and disability". Though Eurostat’s 
methodology does not allow us to com-
pare levels of veteran benefits directly, 
it is plausible to expect that Croatia’s 
"bloated" figure for sickness and disa-
bility is largely due to veteran disability 
pensions. Regarding levels of social ex-
penditure on other categories, the con-
trast with Slovenia is instructive. While 
on a comparable level of overall expend-
iture on social protection, Slovenia has 
higher levels of expenditure than Croa-
tia in all categories except sickness and 
disability. For instance, while in Croatia 
2.8% of government expenditure goes 
towards family and children, it Slovenia 
the corresponding figure is 4.1% (and 
in Denmark it is 8.3%). In its most re-
cent report, the European Commission 
stated that regarding social protection of 
people below 65 years of age, Croatia is 
characterised by poor targeting of those 
most in need, while at the same time 
supporting "privileged categories such 
as war veterans" (2018: 22). 
Though these figures may create the 
impression of a highly-privileged popu-
lation, analysts note that compensatory 
government programmes have created 
a passive, state-dependent population 
(Dobrotić 2008). Given that during the 
war these were generally young people, 
most often with only secondary educa-
tion qualifications, with little or no job 
experience prior to going to war, the 
compensatory approach has contribut-
ed to their social isolation (ibid.). In the 
1990s, veterans were overrepresented in 
lower socioeconomic groups such as the 
unemployed, welfare recipients and the 
poor (Žunec 2006). More recently, the 
European Commission (2018) reports 
how little progress has been made to 
support war veterans' re-integration into 
























This "compensatory" approach to-
wards the veteran population echoes 
findings regarding the similarly "com-
pensatory" character of family policy 
in Croatia (Zrinščak 2008; Dobrotić 
2015). Croatia is characterised by one 
of the lowest coverage rates of children 
in pre-school education and care (Mat-
ković and Dobrotić 2013), which con-
tributes to mothers leaving the labour 
market, and to their generally lower em-
ployment rates (Dobrotić 2015). In that 
sense it could be argued that the state’s 
programmes for veterans have been 
incorporated within the framework 
of explicit familialism (Vučković and 
Dobrotić 2016) and state paternalism – 
both of which are features of conserva-
tive welfare regimes (Esping Andersen 
2000). However, because veterans are, 
according to Schneider and Ingram 
(1993) "advantaged" groups, while chil-
dren and mother are "dependents", this 
results in over-allocating resources to 
the first group, while mostly paying lip 
service to the other. As Schneider and 
Ingram (1993: 338) argue, the state 
wants to appear aligned with the inter-
ests of children and mothers, "but their 
lack of political power makes it difficult 
to direct resources toward them". In oth-
er words, the veterans’ capacity for polit-
ical mobilization represents the crucial 
distinction of this population, which is 
analysed in the following two sections. 
Veterans as a Civil Society Actor
Though HDZ governments in the early 
1990s were willing to provide material 
compensation to the veteran popula-
tion, arguably much of the generous 
package would not have happened wi-
thout veterans organizing and putting 
pressure on the state. In the spring of 
1992 the first veteran NGO was foun-
ded, and in 1993 they held a federative 
assembly of over 15 chapters. The as-
sembly meeting was attended by the 
President of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, 
and General Martin Špegelj, the first 
Chief of Staff of the Croatian Armed 
Forces, was elected president of the 
association.
The Association of Patriotic War Vol-
unteers and Veterans of the Republic of 
Croatia (UDVDR), as the federation is 
called, today has 21-member organiza-
tions at county level, over 200 chapters 
on the local level, and around 80 social 
clubs. Its website boasts a membership 
of 220,000, "representing the popula-
tion of around 350,000 Croatian vet-
erans, who together with their families 
come close to one million citizens of 
Croatia".20 The Association of Disa-
bled Veterans of the Homeland War 
(HVIDR-a) is similarly federated across 
Croatia, with member organizations on 
the county level.21 According to Miha-
lec, Pavlin and Relja (2012), HVIDRa 
has a membership of 35,000, with 20 
regional and 105 local chapters. Its 
president served as HDZ’s Member of 
Parliament and he headed the parlia-
mentary Board for Veterans.22 During 
2010, veteran NGOs participated in 
13 advisory and consultative bodies of 
the government, spanning issues from 
employment policies to regional de-
velopment. According to Lendvai and 
Stubbs (2015: 460), HVIDRa enables 
veterans "to play a strong political role 
in Croatia and are addressed as a key 
beneficiary of extensive social benefits, 
much higher than those received by ci-
vilian victims of war or by those at risk 
of poverty and social exclusion". Finally, 
20 Quoted from the website of the organiza-
tion, accessible in Croatian at http://www.
udvdr.hr/povjesnica-2/. Accessed on Febru-
ary 25, 2018.
21 The website of HVIDR-a is much less infor-
mative about its size and composition; 
http://www.hvidra.hr/ 
22 HVIDRA also plays an important political 




















































the Association of Volunteer Veterans, 
the third largest federation of veteran 
NGOs, has member organizations in 8 
of the 21 counties, with chapters and 
clubs like UDVDR.23
In addition to large associations of 
NGOs, there are 795 active NGOs that 
list veteran issues as their primary ob-
jective.24 Figure 1 shows their density 
across Croatia. Density is calculated 
as the number of NGOs divided by 
the number of inhabitants in the given 
county, with darker shades of blue rep-
resenting higher density.25
23 Document available at http://www.uhbddr.
hr/pdf/ustrojbeni%20oblici%20udruge.
pdf. Accessed on February 25, 2018.
24 Information from Ministry of Administra-
tion, Official Registry of NGOs
25 I thank Sven Marcelić from the Department 
of Sociology at the University of Zadar for 
making the map. 
Two findings stand out. Firstly, while 
active veteran NGOs cover practically 
the entire country, the highest density 
is in the parts of Croatian territory that 
was occupied during the war. However, 
when we disregard population size and 
look only at number of NGOs per coun-
ty, the highest number of NGOs is in 
Zagreb (105), followed by Split County 
(103) and Osijek County with 76 NGOs. 
This suggests that many NGOs register 
in the largest cities, a finding support-
ed by other research on NGO density 
in Croatia (Marcelić 2016). In the case 
of veteran NGOs, the motivation for 
setting up organizations in large cities 
is probably to focus on advocacy initia-
tives. Furthermore, these organizations’ 
capacity to mobilize might be relying on 
a synergy with government and munic-
ipal authorities, which is what Bougarel 
(2006) describes in the case of Bosnia 
Figure 1. Density of Veteran NGOs in Croatia, 2016 
























and Herzegovina. The fact that in 2017 
the HDZ-led government secured man-
datory financing of veterans' associa-
tions in the range of 0.3-1.0 % of local 
government budgets (European Com-
mission 2018) certainly speaks to that 
effect. All in all, veteran organizations 
seem to be important conduits in the 
clientelist relationship between veter-
ans and the state (Stubbs and Zrinščak 
2015).
The UDVDR was the first veteran 
organization to exert political pressure 
on the government, starting in 1993 
when it adopted its first "Declaration 
on Veterans in the Homeland War", 
and 1994 when it adopted the "Resolu-
tion on Rights of Croatian Veterans of 
the Homeland War". Both documents 
were advocacy initiatives for regulating 
social rights of veterans and their fam-
ilies. In October 1996 UDVRD organ-
ized a high-profile event in the Zagreb 
Concert Hall, in the presence of high 
ranking government officials, at which 
the NGO president presented "15 Fun-
damental Demands", together with a pe-
tition signed by 90,000 veterans to sup-
port the introduction of these demands 
into the "Act on Rights of Croatian 
Veterans".26 Though the initial reaction 
of President Tuđman to these demands 
was unfriendly, two months later, in De-
cember, the government legislated a new 
"Act on the Rights of Croatian Veterans 
from the Homeland War and their Fam-
ilies" (NN 108/96, 23. December 1996). 
Following that, in 1997 the government 
set up a separate Ministry for Veterans, 
fulfilling another request by veteran or-
ganizations. 
Overall, between 1993 and 1996, 
partly of its own volition, and party in 
response to pressures from veteran or-
26 Information based on the report on 
UDVRD website, http://www.udvdr.hr/
kategorija/aktivnosti-od-1992-1999. Acce-
ssed on February 25, 2018.
ganizations, HDZ governments created 
a comprehensive institutional architec-
ture of rights and entitlements for vet-
erans and their families. This in turn 
created a strong bond between HDZ 
and the veteran population (Kasapović 
1996), which has been described as a 
powerful client-patron axis charged 
both with symbolic meaning and ma-
terial benefits (Čular 2000). According 
to Kasapović (2001), during the 1990s 
HDZ maintained rule by securing lav-
ish state subsidies, privileged access to 
public sector jobs, privatization prof-
its and diverse forms of social rights 
to veterans as one of its main interest 
groups. This echoes Ferrera’s (1996) de-
scription of Italy’s Christian Democrats 
(DC) as a mass patronage party which 
granted their clients job opportunities 
in the public sector and assisted them 
in obtaining benefits and subsidies from 
the state. This was implemented in part 
through the by-passing of regular state 
channels via the creation of special com-
mittees or other bodies entrusted with 
the provision of benefits (Ferrera 1996). 
The 1997 institution of a separate Min-
istry for Veterans in Croatia may have 
served similar purposes.
While HDZ governments extended 
both availability and reach of existing 
programmes to secure votes among 
their core constituency (Glaurdić and 
Vuković 2016), SDP-led governments 
attempted to regulate and cut down 
welfare programmes for veterans. Un-
der the first SDP-led government 2001-
2003, state pensions, disability support 
and other benefits were reduced and 
discontinued (Begić, Sanader and Žunec 
2007). Conversely, significant changes 
regarding pensions occurred in election 
years when HDZ was incumbent. The 
first was an amendment to the Act on 
Pension Insurance in 1999, when a cat-
egory of work disabled, which was un-



















































transferred to disability pensions. This 
created 37,112 new recipients of disabil-
ity pensions (Bađun 2011). The number 
of disabled veterans registered in the 
pension system grew 3 times between 
2003 and 2010, years of the first and sec-
ond Sanader government. The largest 
increase was in election year 2007, with 
5,500 new insurances issued for disabil-
ity veterans. Similarly, in 2017 HDZ-led 
government reopened registration of 
disabled veterans into the pension sys-
tem. As already mentioned, in the few 
months since the law was adopted, there 
were nearly 4,000 new applications.
Dolenec and Širinić (forthcoming)27 
analysis of the impact of veterans’ pro-
test on electoral politics shows that in 
periods when HDZ is in opposition, vet-
eran mobilization becomes highly con-
tentious. In contrast, when HDZ is in 
government, veteran organizations align 
with the state, pro-actively mobilizing to 
strengthen its legitimacy and weaken 
oppositional claims to power. Further-
more, in a dynamic similar to the Law 
and Justice party (PiS) in Poland, HDZ 
supports and coordinates mass mobi-
lization around key commemorative 
events of the Homeland War, through 
which the party renews its ties to veter-
ans as "fathers of the state". Building on 
these findings in terms of demonstrat-
ing the mobilization capacity of veter-
an organizations, the following section 
focuses on how veteran organizations 
have used citizens’ petitions for referen-
da as a tool for political mobilization. 
Veterans Mobilizing to 
Protect the Status Quo 
Citizens initiatives for referenda were 
introduced in Croatia with the constitu-
tional amendments in November 2000, 
27 Paper presented at the State Mobilized Con-
tention international conference in Hong 
Kong, January 12-13, 2017. Currently sub-
mitted for publication. 
allowing citizens to initiate referenda 
upon the collection of signatures from 
10% of voters in Croatia within 15 days.28 
Veterans’ initiative "Headquarter for 
Defending the Dignity of the Homeland 
War" submitted a citizens' initiative to 
the parliament that same year, in April 
2001. Feeling threatened by the change 
of government, veterans demanded a 
referendum be held to forbid Croatia's 
cooperation with The Hague Tribunal 
(Smerdel 2010). Two months earlier, in 
February 2001, warrants for the arrest of 
several people suspected of involvement 
in a wartime murder were issued, inclu-
ding the Croatian Army General Mir-
ko Norac (Dolenec 2013). In response, 
the HDZ harnessed the revolt within 
the veterans’ population to stage a large 
public protest in Split, ostensibly in his 
honour. According to some analysts, at 
that moment HDZ had hoped to topple 
the SDP-led coalition (Babić 2003). This 
was the context for the April 2001 vete-
rans’ initiative against cooperation with 
The Hague Tribunal. Though the initia-
tive collected 400,000 signatures (Smer-
del 2010), the referendum never took 
place. The legal reason that was used 
to render this initiative invalid was the 
fact that the Referendum Act had not 
yet been amended, and hence the legal 
framework was not in conformity with 
constitutional changes. 
Veteran organizations initiated their 
second petition for referendum in 2007, 
again with the objective of stopping 
Croatia's cooperation with The Hague 
Tribunal. However, the political oppor-
tunity structure was quite different. The 
SDP-led coalition had been replaced by 
a re-vamped HDZ under the leadership 
28 By comparison, in Switzerland the required 
percentage of signatures is less than 2% of 
registered voters, while the period for the 
collection of signatures is 18 months (Kriesi 
2005). Closer to home, in Slovenia around 
2% of voters' signatures must be collected 
























of Ivo Sanader. He had initiated the 
transformation of a nationalist organisa-
tion into a Christian Democratic Party 
(Zakošek 2002; Dolenec 2008, 2009). In 
other words, the referendum initiative 
took place in a context in which HDZ 
stood behind European integration as 
the primary political objective, though 
not without cost to its constituency 
(Čular 2010). Without HDZ support 
veterans were not able to collect the nec-
essary number of signatures, though a 
respectable number of 296,00029 testifies 
to the serious rift that the party's stance 
towards The Hague Tribunal had caused 
in its voter base. 
After the 2007 initiative, the veteran 
population retreated from large public 
campaigns, to return after an SDP-gov-
ernment came into office in December 
2011. With HDZ again in opposition, 
veterans’ associations became politically 
active. In March 2013 the "Headquarter 
for the Defense of Croatian Vukovar" 
campaigned in the local election against 
the incumbent Social Democratic may-
or, supporting the HDZ candidate in 
exchange for his endorsement of their 
demand to grant Vukovar the status 
of "special piety" which would exempt 
it from the use of Serbian Cyrillic on 
public buildings. Their candidate did 
not win the local election, and the gov-
ernment pursued the implementation 
of the said policy in autumn the same 
year. This action was met with acts of 
civil disobedience, including repeated-
ly tearing down Serbian Cyrillic plac-
ards – leading to several arrests between 
September and November of 2013.30 
29 "296,000 moral acts", published on Oct 18, 
2007 by Hrvatsko kulturno vijeće, available 
at: http://www.hkv.hr/izdvojeno/ko men-
tari/mmb/1445-komentar-296-tisua-moral-
nih-inova.html. Accessed March 18, 2018. 
30 On September 23, 2013 N1 television repor-
ted on six arrests in Vukovar, avail able at: 
http://hr.n1info.com/a1319/Vijesti/ U-Vu-
kovaru-porazbijali-i-poskidali-sve-dvo-
The standoff between veteran organ-
izations and the SDP-led government 
culminated during Remembrance Day 
on November 18, 2013, when the pro-
cession through the streets of Vukovar 
with the Prime Minister, the President 
of the State, other government officials 
and diplomats, was cordoned off into a 
different route from the one led by war 
veterans’ associations31. Building on a 
month-long crisis in which veterans 
were tearing down placards from public 
buildings in Vukovar, the situation was 
close to violence.
The day before, on November 17, the 
Headquarter had started the collection 
of signatures for a referendum in which 
they proposed to restrict the use of Ser-
bian Cyrillic on public buildings to lo-
cations where the Serb population was 
the majority, invalidating their language 
right as a constitutionally recognised mi-
nority. Undertaking a public campaign 
for which they had HDZ’s tacit support, 
they managed to collect 632,165 signa-
tures.32 which was more than enough 
for initiating a referendum. Like was the 
case in 2001 and 2007, the Constitution-
al court ruled the question inadmissible, 
and the referendum did not take place. 
However, veteran organizations soon 
"upped the odds" of their confrontation 
with the SDP government. In October 
2014, they occupied a public square in 
front of the Ministry of Veterans on 66 
Savska street, one of the busiest thor-
jezicne-ploce-pet-osoba-je-uhiceno.html. 
Accessed March 18, 2018. 
31 How the event unfolded can be seen in the 
report by TV station Slavonska Televizija, 
broadcast on Nov 18, 2013. The news clip 
is available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=plDk9XqaHGQ. Accessed March 
18, 2018.
32 "Stožer uz pjesmu predao potpise za refe-
rendum o ćirilici", December 16, 2013, 
Večernji list; available at: https://www.
vecernji.hr/vijesti/stozer-632165-potpisa- 
za-referendum-o-cirilici-nosi-u-sabor- 



















































oughfares in Zagreb, demanding the 
resignation of the Minister and his key 
aids. Through this action they initiated 
a sit-in that lasted 555 days33, ending af-
ter HDZ returned to power. The start of 
this protest was aligned with the elector-
al campaign for presidential elections, 
which the incumbent Social Democratic 
president Ivo Josipović lost to HDZ can-
didate, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. The 
first place she visited on election night, 
and again upon assuming office, was 
the veterans’ tent on 66 Savska Street. 
Though the 2015 parliamentary election 
was close,34 HDZ won that too. HDZ 
party member who had been an active 
participant in the veteran protest on 66 
Savska Street became the new Minister 
of Veterans. 
Croatia as a Conservative 
Welfare Regime
The objective of this paper was to theo-
rize about the type of welfare state that 
emerged in Croatia post-1990, focusing 
specifically on ways in which the evo-
lution of welfare programmes for vete-
rans, and the gradual strengthening of 
veteran organizations as pivotal political 
actors, impacted its morphology. Ha-
ving in mind that comparative research 
on Croatia as a welfare regime type, as 
well as many aspects of the character 
and impact of state programmes for 
veterans in Croatia are under-researc-
hed, a more comprehensive treatment 
of many substantive issues raised in this 
33 "Nakon 555 dana napokon završio brani-
teljski prosvjed u Savskoj", April 26, 2016, 
Večernji list; available at: https://www.
vecernji.hr/vijesti/nakon-555-dana-konac-
no-je-zavrsio-braniteljski-prosvjed-u-
savskoj-1079361. Accessed March 18, 2018. 
34 The Homeland Coalition, led by HDZ, 
won 33,4 % of the vote in comparison with 
the coalition led by the Social Democrats, 
which won 33,2% of the vote (State Elec-
toral Commission, data available on their 
website: www.izbori.hr). 
paper must await further analyses. This 
analysis should be read primarily as the-
ory development, fostering new hypot-
heses about the role of veteran organiza-
tions and state programmes for veterans 
in the development of the welfare state 
regime in Croatia.
In Croatia, apart from pensioners, the 
largest social group compensated by the 
state are war veterans. Croatia current-
ly has a population of around 500,000 
registered veterans, which in the mid-
1990 started organizing into large fed-
erative organizations across the territo-
ry of Croatia. Partly in response to this 
mobilization, from 1994 onwards HDZ 
governments created a comprehensive 
institutional architecture of entitlements 
for veterans, instituting durable material 
linkages alongside symbolic ties to this 
population. Over time, the dense or-
ganizational structure of veteran organ-
izations and their synergy with govern-
mental and municipal authorities con-
tributed to their strong mobilizational 
capacity, influencing the country’s po-
litical dynamics – usually to strengthen 
HDZ electorally and to weaken opposi-
tional claims to power.
However, this relationship has on oc-
casion created significant pressure on 
HDZ governments as well. Clients with 
strong mobilization capacity are only 
ever partially in service of their patron. 
Maintaining their power depends on 
occasionally demonstrating that they 
can "go rogue" on their political ally, by 
vetoing decisions or putting pressure 
on governments that drift away from 
their preferred policy direction. This 
dynamic was revealed in how veteran 
organizations have used citizens’ peti-
tions for referenda. Out of the three in-
stances when they mobilized to collect 
signatures for referenda, twice they had 
HDZ support, and once they were in 
opposition to official HDZ policy. The 
























fies to the importance that alliance with 
HDZ has for the veteran organizations: 
only when they worked together were 
they able to cross the high mobilization 
necessary to fulfil criteria for initiating 
a referendum. Tying the strands of this 
analysis together, it seems safe to say 
that veteran organizations are a crucial 
interest group shaping Croatia’s polit-
ical dynamics. This is reflected both in 
the domain of the welfare state, where 
they have often been able to veto major 
changes that go against their interests, 
and in the domain of electoral politics, 
where they have engaged in contentious 
politics with the intention of influenc-
ing electoral outcomes to the advantage 
of the party they perceive as protecting 
their interests.
How does the prominence of veter-
ans as the pivotal political actor factor 
into our analysis of Croatia as a con-
servative welfare regime? A strong reli-
ance on the family for a broad range of 
care work is the central feature Croatia 
shares with other conservative welfare 
regimes. Furthermore, the clientelist 
character of state-society relations links 
it specifically to the Southern variant of 
conservative welfare regimes. Finally, 
and distinctly, the fact that the state sus-
tains a very large population of men on 
social benefits creates complex political 
and social effects, only some of which 
have been addressed in this paper. On 
the one hand, veterans have emerged as 
a political actor capable of influencing 
elections, reinforcing dominant cleavag-
es and hence sustaining the militarized 
political culture that permeates polit-
ical life in Croatia. On the other hand, 
it has also lead to a situation in which 
the fundamental principle of deserv-
edness from work, which underlies the 
concept of solidarity in welfare states, is 
in Croatia in competition with the prin-
ciple of deservedness derived from the 
"moral asymmetry" whereby the state 
compensates veterans for their absolute 
sacrifice in the past. This "compensato-
ry" character of state-society relations, 
which is characteristic of family policy 
in Croatia generally, creates contradic-
tory impulses of dependency on the 
state and resentment towards the state. 
Even though veterans are celebrated 
as heroes, the fact that they resemble 
recipients of care rather than the mod-
el of the male breadwinner, might be 
having complex effects on patriarchal 
gender relations. Notwithstanding that, 
the key distinction between veterans 
on the one hand, and women and chil-
dren on the other vis-à-vis the state, is 
the strong mobilization capacity of the 
former. Following Schneider and In-
gram’s (1993) argumentation, they rep-
resent an advantaged group which is 
amply compensated by the state, while 
policies directed towards children and 
mothers, who are socially construed as 
"dependents", usually amount to lip-ser-
vice: verbal displays of concern that are 
not followed by adequate allocation of 
resources. At the same time, if social 
programmes for veterans support en-
tire families, perhaps they should be 
thought of as part of family policy, im-
pacting both gender relations and elec-
toral dynamics. In summary, though 
many features of this analysis are ex-
ploratory rather than confirmatory, 
Croatia seems to be a specific clientelist 
variant of a conservative welfare regime, 
sustained by veteran mobilizations, but 
at the same time eroded by the depend-
ency, resentment and a myriad of other 
social impacts that these programmes 
have on the target population. Future 
research on the welfare state in Croatia 
will hopefully address them, putting to 
the test some of the arguments that this 
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Vojnička država? Veterani i socijalna država  
u Hrvatskoj
Sažetak Rad se bavi inačicom socijalne države koja se od devedesetih godina ra-
zvijala u hrvatskoj, odnosno pitanjem kako su socijalni programi za veterane i pre-
tvaranje veteranskih organizacija u ključne političke aktere utjecali na njezin razvoj. 
hrvatska ima oko pola milijuna registriranih veterana te snažne i brojne veteranske 
organizacije. Djelomice reagirajući na mobilizaciju veteranskih organizacija, vlade 
predvođene hDZ-om stvarale su od 1994. trajne materijalne povlastice za vetera-
ne, uz simbolične poveznice koje njeguju od svršetka Domovinskog rata. Jačanje 
veteranskih organizacija kao političkih aktera utjecalo je stoga na razvoj socijalne 
države u hrvatskoj. Snažno oslanjanje na obitelj u pružanju skrbi središnje je obi-
lježje koje hrvatska dijeli s drugima konzervativnim socijalnim državama, dok je kli-
jentelistički karakter odnosa između države i društvenih skupina povezuje s južnim 
tipom konzervativne socijalne države. nadalje, hrvatsku obilježavaju "kompenza-
cijski" socijalni programi, kako za veterane tako i u obiteljskoj politici općenito, koji 
imaju kontradiktorne društvene učinke. Klijentelističku inačicu konzervativne soci-
jalne države u hrvatskoj održava politička mobilizacija veteranskih organizacija, ali 
je istodobno nagrizaju odnosi ovisnosti, predbacivanja i brojni drugi socijalni učinci 
tih programa. ovaj rad ukazuje na potrebu obuhvatnijih komparativnih istraživanja 
socijalne države u hrvatskoj.
Ključne riječi tipovi socijalne države, esping Andersen, veterani, politička mobili-
zacija, hrvatska

